Santa Clara Law Review
Volume 16 | Number 2

Article 3

1-1-1976

Drug Intoxication and Criminal Responsibility:
Old Dilemmas and a New Proposal
Ann Fingarette Hasse

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Ann Fingarette Hasse, Drug Intoxication and Criminal Responsibility: Old Dilemmas and a New Proposal, 16 Santa Clara L. Rev. 249
(1976).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview/vol16/iss2/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Santa
Clara Law Review by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.

DRUG INTOXICATION AND CRIMINAL
RESPONSIBILITY: OLD DILEMMAS
AND A NEW PROPOSAL
Ann Fingarette Hasse*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Defendant X has been charged with the first degree murder of Y. The facts as proven at trial are the following:
Defendant, while with Y on a camping trip, took an LSD
tablet. Shortly after taking the tablet, as X watched his companion sleep, Y made noises which sounded to the defendant
like those of a rabid dog which defendant's father had shot
when he was a small boy. Defendant took fright and shot his
companion.'
Testimony at trial by a defense expert showed that LSD,
like other hallucinogens, can produce a range of mental states,
including hallucinations, delusions, and partial amnesia. Effects of the drug may range from a loss of time and space
perception to panic, paranoid delusions, and reactions very
similar to schizophrenia. 2 Another defense expert testified that
at the time of the act, defendant was not aware of the quality
and nature of his act. There was no testimony, however, that
defendant had a mental disease or defect, only that he was in
a state of intoxication caused by LSD. It was shown that defendant had used LSD on previous occasions.
Defendant X asks the trial judge to instruct the jury that
if defendant could not distinguish right from wrong, he is enti3
tled to a verdict of acquittal. Alternatively, he requests in*Member of the State Bar of California; Law Clerk to Chief Judge Oliver J. Carter,
United States District Court, Northern District of California, 1973-75.
1. The basic facts in this example are derived from State v. Hall, 214 N.W.2d
205 (Iowa 1974). They have been slightly modified.
This article is part of a comprehensive study in collaboration with Professor Herbert Fingarette of the University of California, Santa Barbara, on the broad theme of
mental disability and the law. The thesis presented here is one which is developed in
detail in that forthcoming work, tentatively titled Mental Disabilitiesand Criminal
Responsibility [hereinafter cited as Mental Disabilities]. I would like to express my
deep appreciation to Professor Fingarette for his practical and spiritual assistance in
preparing this article; however, he is not responsible for any of the specific arguments
advanced here.
2. See note 6 infra.
3. For purposes of this article, I will use the definition of insanity as advanced
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structions to the effect that if, due to drug intoxication, defendant did not form any one or more of the specific mental
states
required as an essential element of the crime of first
degree
murder, he is not guilty of that crime. How should the
judge
rule on his requests?
Since the late 1960's, a number of courts have been confronted with defendants who have committed criminal
acts
while under the influence of voluntarily ingested mind-altering
drugs; consequently, judges have been forced to deal with
complex and fundamental issues regarding the degree of the
defendant's responsibility.
Should a person who, like X, voluntarily takes a drug with
knowledge of its potentially disabling and disorienting
effects
on the mind, be completely acquitted of a crime on the
ground
of insanity because, at the time of the act, he could not
distinguish right from wrong? The prospect of complete acquittal
for
intoxicated harmdoers, not surprisingly, has met with
great
resistance.' The absence of "mental disease" provides
a logical
and traditional basis in law for rejecting this defense.
Is it legally or psychologically accurate to say of a person
such as X who was deluded or hallucinatory, yet who
intended
to kill a person whom he perceived as threatening him,
that he
did not have the required "specific intent" to kill? The
usual
effect of this defense, when successful, is to reduce the
degree
of the crime. But, however desirable the result, this
defense
simply does not fit the facts of most cases involving
druginduced intoxication.
in M'Naghten's Case, 10 Clark & F. 200, 210, 8 Eng.
Rep. 718, 722 (H.L. 1843): a
defendant is insane if he "was labouring under such a
defect of reason, from disease
of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of
the act he was doing, or if he
did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was
wrong." It will be seen that
the problems raised are not affected by the variant
forms of M'Naghten, or by the
addition of a "loss of free-will" clause, Davis v. United States,
165 U.S. 373, 378 (1897);
Parsons v. State, 81 Ala. 577, 596-97, 2 So. 854, 866-67
(1887), or by the modernized
version of these to be found in the American Law Institute's
Model Penal Code insanity
test. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Proposed Official Draft
1962). All the tests require a
finding of "mental disease," and therein lies the crux
of the difficulty in ascribing
insanity to one who is voluntarily drug-intoxicated. For
a general discussion of the
insanity tests, see H. FINGARETTE, THE MEANING OF CRIMINAL
INSANITY (1972), and A.
GOL)STEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE (1967). The criticisms
levied against the M'Naghten
test are chronicled in Student Symposium on the Proposed
California Criminal Code,
19 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 550, 557-60 (1972).
4. See, e.g., United States v. Romano, 482 F.2d 1183
(5th Cir. 1973); State v.
Cooper, 111 Ariz. 332, 529 P.2d 231 (1974); State v. Hall,
214 N.W.2d 205 (Iowa 1974);
Commonwealth v. Campbell, 445 Pa. 488, 284 A.2d 798
(1971); State v. Bellue, 260
S.C. 39, 194 S.E.2d 193 (1973).
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Should a defendant such as X be held to have no legally
acceptable defense, complete or mitigating, because he is not
legally insane (that is, he has no "mental disease") and because he did in fact specifically intend to kill? The effect of this
approach seems both psychologically unrealistic and morally
oppressive.
Until recently there seem to have been only these three
alternatives seriously considered. 5 Yet clearly a fourth question
remains to be asked: is there another option that both appropriately assesses X's criminal responsibility and also fits readily within the framework of relevant law?
The problem is one which is in urgent need of resolution.
In our society there is increasingly common use of hallucinogenic and other types of drugs having consciousness-altering
effects significantly different from alcohol. It is the purpose of
5. Although the question of a defendant's criminal responsibility when he commits a crime while drug-intoxicated defines a relatively new area of consideration for
legal commentators, there is already a certain amount of literature on the subject. Law
review writers in general have tended to accept as the only relevant theories the
insanity defense and the specific intent exception. Kenneth Baumgartner, in The
Effect of Drugs on Criminal Responsibility, Specific Intent and Mental Competency,
8 Am. CRIM. L.Q. 118 (1970), concludes that the specific intent exception will be
increasingly used in cases when the defendant acted while under the influence of drugs
because the exception rests on an established body of law and overcomes the problem
of unconditionally releasing defendants. In LSD-Its Effect on Criminal
Responsibility, 17 DE PAUL L. REV. 365 (1968), Philip Wolin accepts both theories as
tenable and argues that the applicability of either defense depends primarily on the
facts of the individual case. Gary Lunger in The Effect of Drug-Induced Intoxication
on the Issue of Criminal Responsibility, 8 CrM. L. BULL. 731 (1972), approaches the
question as one of prosecutorial or defense strategy and suggests what are in essence
two opposite views: (1) the prosecutorial view that society could hold criminally responsible anyone who uses drugs; and (2) the defense view that a "toxic psychosis," a
psychosis induced by drugs, could result in a successful insanity defense.
Other articles have approached the general question of control of drug abuse from
the legislative perspective, e.g., Bartels, Better Living Through Legislation: Control
of Mind-Altering Drugs, 21 U. KANS. L. REV. 439 (1973), or from the medical and
sociological points of view, e.g., Contemporary Problems of Drug Abuse: A National
Symposium for Law and Medical Students, 18 VILL. L. REV. 787 (1973).
6. This article is primarily directed to intoxication from those drugs that tend
to have effects which are substantially unlike the effects of alcohol. Drugs of major
concern in this context can be grouped into two categories: (1) the aminergic agents
(commonly termed hallucinogens and psychedelics) whose best known representatives
are LSD and mescaline; (2) the amphetamines, including benzedrine, dexedrine and
methamphetamine (often referred to as "speed"). Both types of drugs can induce
hallucinations and delusions as well as a toxically produced paranoid schizophrenic
condition. Of less concern here are euphoria-producing drugs such as marijuana and
hashish. M. GERALD, PHARMACOLOGY (1974) [hereinafter cited as PHARMACOLOGY], particularly Table 17-1. For further analysis of the effects of various drugs, see DeLong,
The Drugs and Their Effects, in Dealing with Drug Abuse: A Report to the Ford
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this article to display the inherent contradictions of traditional
doctrines when applied to the problem of the drug-intoxicated
offender; and to propose a new approach which appropriately
assesses the criminal responsibility of such an offender.'
II.

TRADITIONAL APPROACHES TO DRUG INTOXICATION:
SHORTCOMINGS

A.

Specific Intent Exception and the Alcohol Intoxication
Analogy
A majority of courts have chosen to analogize the situation
of the drug-intoxicated offender to that of the alcoholintoxicated offender.' The classic rule on the inebriated offender is that voluntary intoxication is no defense to a crime;
but if the degree of intoxication was sufficient to prevent the
defendant from forming the specific mental state required for
the charged crime, he cannot be convicted of that crime This
rule is known as the "specific intent exception." "General
Foundation 62 (Staff Paper No. 1, 1972); Lunter, The Effect of Drug-Induced Intoxication on the Issue of Criminal Responsibility, 8 CraM. L. BULL. 738-41 (1972).
However, any classification of a drug and its effect should be regarded with some
wariness since the effect of any drug on any person is dependent on a number of factors.
Among them are purity of the drug, how it is administered, the state of the person's
health, his expectations of the drug's effect, and the setting in which the drug is taken.
R. BLUM, D. BOVET, & J. MOORE, CONTROLLING DRUGS: INTERNATIONAL HAND3OOK FOR
PSYCHOACTIvE DRUG CLASSIFICATION ch. 1-3 (1974) [hereinafter cited as CONTROLLING
DRUGS]. Much discussion assumes a regular and specific effect of a drug,
when in
reality one must consider a classification as a "probability" or an "estimate." See R.
BLUM, SOCIETY AND DRUGS 279 (1970); CONTROLLING DRUGS, supra.
7. The approach offered in this article is substantially that proposed in Mental
Disabilities,supra note 1.
8. See, e.g., United States v. Romano, 482 F.2d 1183 (5th Cir. 1973); State v.
Clark, 187 N.W.2d 717 (Iowa 1971); State v. Rushing, 85 N.M. 540, 514 P.2d 297 (1973);
State v. Nelson, 83 N.M. 269, 490 P.2d 1242 (1971); Couch v. State, 375 P.2d 978 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1962); State v. Smith, 260 Ore. 511, 490 P.2d 1262 (1971); State v. Roisland, 1 Ore. App. 68, 459 P.2d 555 (1969).
Just such an approach is explicitly built into the recently proposed Criminal
Justice Reform Act of 1975, S.1, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 523(a) [hereinafter cited as
S. 11:
It is a defense to a prosecution under any federal statute that the defendant, as a result of intoxication, lacks the state of mind required to be
proved as an element of the offense charged if: (1) intent or knowledge is
the state of mind required ....
(b)(1) "[Ijntoxication" means a disturbance of a mental or physical
capacity resulting from the introduction of alcohol or a drug or other
substance into the body ....
9. E.g., CAL. PEN. CODE § 22 (West 1970). See note 12 and accompanying text
infra.
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criminal intent" cannot be negated by evidence of intoxication. 0
The intrinsic worth of the specific intent exception-and
its usefulness for the area of drug-intoxication-cannot be assessed properly unless one examines the historical development
of the exception. Such an examination reveals that, even with
reference to the area of alcohol intoxication, the specific intent
exception has two serious flaws: first, the technical distinctions
upon which the doctrine is based are unsound; and second, the
practical results are highly inconsistent."
Although the "specific intent exception" to the rule that
intoxication is no defense began as a straightforward attempt
10. People v. Rocha, 3 Cal. 3d 893, 479 P.2d 372, 92 Cal. Rptr. 1721 (1971);
Annot., 8 A.L.R.3d 1236 (1966). See note 15 infra.
The provisions of S. 1, supra note 8,seem to differ in this respect. For example,
the various relevant provisions of S. 1, when taken together, appear to imply that the
intoxication defense as applied to homicide could lead to complete acquittal. Such a
result would be contrary to a basic-and desirable-aim of the "specific intent exception": complete acquittal should not be allowed if intoxication was voluntary. This
result could occur under S. I in the following way. Section 303(a) requires that "[a]
state of mind must be proved with respect to each element of an offense" (with
exceptions that do not apply here). Section 301(c) declares that "[tihe states of
mind that may be specified are applicable to: (1) conduct either 'intentional' or 'knowing;' . . . ."A person is guilty of the offense of murder, according to the definition
in section 1601, if "(1) he engages in conduct that knowingly causes the death of
another person; (2) he engages in conduct that causes death of another person under
circumstances in fact manifesting extreme indifference to human life .... " Since
"engaging in conduct" is required in both categories, it is necessary to prove that this
must have been either "intentional" or "knowing." A defendant who had been grossly
drunk might be able to show that he was neither. Under S. 1 he therefore could not be
found guilty of murder. Moreover, since the definitions of manslaughter (section 1602),
negligent homicide (section 1603), and indeed all offenses involving the person (ch. 16)
include as an element of the offense that the defendant have engaged in certain conduct (either in that language or equivalent language) leading to a certain result, the
grossly drunken harmdoer who did not even know what he was doing would be guilty
of no such offense. This anomalous result of S. 1, and the obscurity and arbitrariness
of the "specific intent exception," represent the horns of the dilemma presented by
the basic-and flawed-doctrine that both share, and that is a target of the argument
of this paper.
11. Jerome Hall concluded after careful examination that, although the goal
judges had in mind when creating the specific intent exception was laudatory-to
alleviate the criminal responsibility of the inebriate defendant-the actual state of the
law is unsatisfactory and confused. Hall, Intoxication and CriminalResponsibility, 57
HARV. L. REV. 1061 (1944). Another commentator stated that a "scholar in search of
logic, consistency and clarity of expression in the law would do well to look elsewhere
than in the cases involving intoxication as a defense." Murphy, The Intoxication
Defense: An Introduction to Mr. Smith's Article, 76 DICK. L. REv. 16 (1971).
English courts and commentators are of the same opinion: the trial judge in
Regina v. Howell, [1974] 2 All E.R. 806, 810, remarked that "it is quite impossible"
to deal with the intoxication defense "logically."
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to reduce, without eliminating, the criminal responsibility of
the drunken defendant, this laudable objective has become
submerged in a morass of meaningless dogma. The "exception," as originally conceived, was in fact an application of the
basic rule that if an element of a crime was absent, whether due
to intoxication or otherwise, defendant was not guilty of that
crime.' 2 However, as courts discovered almost immediately, the
result in many cases was not merely mitigation of guilt, but
complete exculpation. In order to dam the flood of potential
acquittals while retaining the mitigating effect of the exception
as first conceived, the phrase "specific intent" was developed
4
into a term of art'I-unfortunately,
a murky and obscure one.
It is used to refer to some "special" mental state, as distinguished from "general" criminal intent. How a "specific" intent differs from "general" intent is often unclear to both
courts and commentators;'" the result has been confusion in the
12. English judges in the 1800's saw the issue very simply as an extension of the
basic principle that, in order to convict the defendant of the alleged offense, all elements of a crime must be shown to be present at the time of the act. Regina v.
Monkhouse, 4 Cox Crim. Cas. 55 (1849); Regina v. Cruse, 173 Eng. Rep. 610 (1838).
As Jerome Hall remarked, "The judges insist straight-facedly that the doctrine is quite
consistent with the traditional rule that voluntary drunkenness never excuses; it is
simply that an objective material element, 'intention,' is lacking in harms committed
in gross intoxication." Hall, Intoxication and Criminal Responsibility, 57 HARV. L.
REV. 1061 (1944).
American judges appear to have had the same principle in mind, although they
were already limiting its application by the 1840's. Pigman v. State, 14 Ohio 555
(1846); Pirtle v. State, 28 Tenn. 663 (1849). For a detailed discussion of the historical
development of the specific intent exception and its current status, see Mental Disabilities, supra note 1, and Comment, Rethinking the Specific-GeneralIntent Doctrine in
California Criminal Law, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 1352 (1975) [hereinafter cited as SpecificGeneral Intent].
13. In Regina v. Moore, 175 Eng. Rep. 571 (1852), defendant was charged with
attempted suicide, claimed she was intoxicated at the time, and was acquitted. In
Regina v. Gamlen, 175 Eng. Rep. 639 (1858), the defendant was charged with assault
as the result of a fray at a fair; he pleaded intoxication and was acquitted. In Pigman
v. State, 14 Ohio 555 (1849), defendant was charged with passing counterfeit bills; the
judge instructed the jury that if defendant did not know the bill was a counterfeit due
to intoxication, he was not guilty.
American courts attempted almost immediately to circumvent the problem in
homicide cases by arbitrarily limiting use of evidence of intoxication so that it could
only be used to reduce a first degree murder charge to second degree. Hopt v. People,
104 U.S. 631 (1881); People v. Vincent, 95 Cal. 425, 30 P. 581 (1892); Pirtle v. State,
28 Tenn. 449 (1849).
14. The term "specific intent" was in common use by the turn of the 20th
century. Schwabacher v. People, 165 Il1. 618, 46 N.E. 809 (1897); Crosby v. People, 136
Il. 655, 27 N.E. 49 (1891); Booher v. State, 156 Ind. 435, 60 N.E. 156 (1901).
15. Jerome Hall stated that efforts to differentiate between "general" and "specific" intent are dubious, and he rejected outright any classification of crimes as
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I
application of the rule, and acquittals still occur. " Indeed, in
recent years, courts occasionally have admitted characterizing
an offense as a "specific intent" crime or a "general intent"
crime on grounds of "public policy" rather than any inherent
logic of the rule, as, for example, the California Supreme Court
did in People v. Hood. 7 There, the court held-arbitrarily, it
acknowledged -that assault was a "general intent" crime."
The court reasoned that because assault is precisely the sort of
crime that drunks frequently commit, if it were designated a
"specific intent" crime, too many defendants would be acquitted under the specific intent exception." The Hood opinion
"general" or "specific" intent crimes. "Insofar as these terms are used to refer to actual
intention, both of them are unfortunate, and the adjectives should be discontinued."
J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW 142 (2d ed. 1960). Other commentators have

agreed that the difference between specific and general intent is nebulous and difficult
to draw. See Annot., 8 A.L.R.3d 1246 n.19 (1966). In his recent voluminous anthology,
Brooks stated that "The distinction thus made between 'specific intent' and 'general
intent' is quite elusive." A. BROOKS, LAW, PSYCHIATRY, AND THE MENTAL HEALTH
SYSTEMS 250 (1975). For a discussion of the problem as it relates to California criminal
law, see Specific-General Intent, supra note 12.
English commentators have also castigated as ambiguous and obscure the meaning of the term "specific intent"; the phrase has a parallel usage in English criminal
law. See Cross, Specific Intent, 1961 CRIM. L. REV. 510; Orchard, Drunkenness, Drugs
and Manslaughter, 1970 CalM. L. REV. 134; Smith, Drink, Drugs and Criminal
Responsibility, 124 NEW L.J. 129 (1974). See also the discussion of the meaning of
specific intent in G. WILLIAMS, THE MENTAL ELEMENT IN CRIME 43-47 (1965). A
commentator on the case of Bolton v. Crawley stated that "the expression 'specific
intent' seems dear to the hearts of judges. . . but unfortunately they never tell us what
it means and any meaning which it may have is shrouded in obscurity." 1972 CRIM.
L. REV. 724.

16. For example, if defendant had no specific intent, he is not guilty of larceny,
State v. Murphy, 107 R.I. 737, 271 A.2d 310 (1970), or forgery, Andrade v. State, 87
Nev. 744, 483 P.2d 208 (1971).
17. 1 Cal. 3d 444, 462 P.2d 370, 82 Cal. Rptr. 618 (1969).
18. [Wlhatever reality the distinction between specific and general
intent may have in other contexts, the difference is chimerical in the case
of assault with a deadly weapon or simple assault. Since the definitions
of both specific intent and general intent cover the requisite intent to
commit a battery, the decision whether or not to give effect to evidence
of intoxication must rest on other considerations.
Id. at 458, 462 P.2d at 378, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 626.
19. Id. at 458, 462 P.2d at 379, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 627. See People v. Kelley, 10 Cal.
3d 565, 516 P.2d 875, 882, 111 Cal. Rptr. 171, 178 (1973), where the court repeated and
reconfirmed its stand: because people who are drunk act rashly and unthinkingly, " 'it
would therefore be anomalous to allow evidence of intoxication to relieve a man of
responsibility for the crimes of assault with a deadly weapon or simple assault, which
are so frequently committed in just such a manner.'" The "specific intent" concept
has also been used by California courts in connection with California's diminished
capacity defense; parallel "policy decisions" distinguishing between specific intent
and general intent crimes for purposes of applying the diminished capacity defense
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reveals clearly that there is no independent meaning to the
distinction between "specific" and "general" intent, and that
the terms are simply a way of allowing judges to manipulate
the law to achieve the desired outcome. Thus the specific intent exception has the dual disadvantage of requiring use of illdefined terms and failing to serve with any reliability or consistency its ultimate purpose: appropriate mitigation without
exculpation.
Without delving further into this murky area of legal
theory, it can be said that the specific intent exception has
severe theoretical and practical flaws;'" therefore, courts should
seriously question the wisdom of expanding its usage to drug
intoxication cases, where the effect on the mind and conduct
can be very different from the effect of alcohol, in ways that
make the "specific intent" language even less apt than in the
case of alcohol intoxication.
Despite its problems, however, most courts regard the specific intent exception as the relevant legal principle to apply in
drug intoxication cases.' Courts agree that intoxication by
drugs should be considered a mitigating factor but should not
result in exculpation. Thus, the fact that permitting the intoxication defense often produces a desirable legal outcome has
undoubtedly helped suppress disquiet at its blatant inappropriateness as a description of the facts. The factual discrepancy
was at first less evident because the drugs involved, until the
1960's, were mainly euphoric and tranquilizing rather than, for
example, hallucinatory or excitatory. This resulted in an almost matter-of-fact extension by the courts of the application
of the specific intent exception from alcohol to drug cases.2 2
The effects of a euphoric or tranquilizing drug were sufficiently
similar to the depressant effects of alcohol for the specific
intent exception to be reasonably applicable. With hallucinatory drugs, however, the discrepancies are blatant.
In the case of defendant X, if the court were to instruct
that voluntary drug intoxication may negate the specific menhave been made. E.g., People v. Nance, 25 Cal. App. 3d 925, 102 Cal. Rptr. 266 (1972);
see 13 SANTA CLARA LAW. 349 (1972).
20. I have argued elsewhere that the specific intent exception should be completely replaced even in connection with alcohol intoxication because of its serious
theoretical and practical defects. See Mental Disabilities,supra note 1.
21. See note 8 supra.
22. See People v. Corson, 221 Cal. App. 2d 579, 34 Cal. Rptr. 584 (1963); De Berry
v. Commonwealth, 289 S.W.2d 495 (Ky. App.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 881 (1956).
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tal states essential to the crime, the jury would have to make
a determination as to the presence of deliberation, premeditation, malice, and intent to kill-the four mental states
essential for first degree murder-at the time of the act.
The jury might well find that all those elements were present;
for although X was acting under a delusion, he meant to kill
and did so deliberately. Even malice, that notably obscure concept, presumably would apply to these facts under most current law. Mere absence of hatred, ill-will or immoral intent is
not sufficient to negate malice, and drug intoxication per se is
not an excuse, justification or mitigation." Since all the requisite specific mental states are thus present, under the specific
intent doctrine, X's criminal responsibility would in no way be
mitigated if the jury correctly applied the law.
In spite of this, realism requires that we recognize that
each and every one of those mental states of X were the product
of an irrational state of mind: the intent to kill was a mad
intent; the deliberation and premeditation were carried out by
a mind filled with delusion. Unfortunately for the defendant
(and for the cause of justice) the specific intent exception
hinges on the absence of a mental state; and in X the relevant
states were present, though the mind that generated them was
irrational. Thus X cannot, in logic, take advantage of the rule.
A jury that applies the law straightforwardly must entirely
ignore the evident irrationality of the defendant at the time of
the offense. If the judge nevertheless allows the defense to be
invoked, the jury may in turn use its common moral sense,
ignore the plain meaning of the terms, and find for the defendant, thus distorting the doctrine in order to achieve the desired mitigating effect.
Even in the face of these discrepancies, the specific intent
exception in drug intoxication cases has become sufficiently
entrenched in the reasoning of most courts to reduce the rule
to mere verbal legerdemain. In 1968, a trial court, faced with a
glue-sniffing defendant who killed a companion while hallucin23. R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 767 (2d ed. 1969) (footnotes omitted):
Despite clear recognition of the non-necessity of any element of hatred,
spite, grudge or ill-will, it seems frequently to be assumed that malice,
as a jural concept, must involve intent plus some matter of aggravation
whereas, in truth, the requirement is fully satisfied by intent minus any
matter of exculpation or mitigation. . . . [1It is recognized that an intent to cause the particular harm involved in the crime in question,
without justification, excuse or mitigation, is sufficient to meet the mensrea requirements of such offenses as murder.
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ating held that instructions on the effects of voluntary intoxication in a drug intoxication case were necessary to carry out the
state's duty to "define criminal responsibility in keeping with
elementary principles of fairness, justice and order."24 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed,
reasoning that, although the instruction historically had been
concerned with voluntary intoxication from alcohol, there was
no constitutional bar to applying it where the intoxication was
caused by drugs.25
However, the blatant inappropriateness of the use of this
doctrine for increasingly numerous drug-intoxication crimes
has at last induced a degree of uneasiness. Judges recently have
begun to recognize the distortion inherent in equating the effects of drugs, particularly those classified as hallucinatory,
with the effects of alcohol: 6
Our intoxication rationale as applied to alcohol simply
does not fit the use of modern hallucinatory drugs; and it
was never meant to. . .they are dissimilar and should be
so regarded."
B.

The Insanity Defense

An orthodox alternative is the insanity defense. A court
faced with defendant X, if it accepted his story as true, would
be hard put to deny that at the time of the act, X was, in at
least a loose sense of the phrase, "temporarily insane." Similarly bizarre drug intoxication crimes suggest the same conclu24. Pierce v. Turner, 276 F. Supp. 289, 300 (D. Utah 1967), aff'd, 402 F.2d 109
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 950 (1968).
25. 402 F.2d at 113.
26. "Inlight of the changing state of medical knowledge regarding hallucinogens,
we think the district court may have underestimated the unique and potentially dangerous impact that prolonged use of LSD appears to have on the psychological state
and behavioral pattern of some users." Brinkley v. United States, 498 F.2d 505, 511
(8th Cir. 1974). Although the trial judge in Pierce v. Turner, 276 F. Supp. 289 (D. Utah
1967), aff'd, 402 F.2d 109 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 950 (1968), admitted that
"[i]ntoxication from glue-sniffing may differ from other types of intoxication," he
nonetheless equated glue-sniffing with alcohol for legal purposes. 276 F. Supp. at 298.
"To treat all [drugs] alike simply because each is classified generally as a drug strikes
me as a judicial cop-out which completely disregards the realities of the situation,"
Judge Le Grand stated in State v. Hall, 214 N.W.2d 205, 213 (Iowa 1973) (dissent).
The provisions of S. 1, supra note 8, thus represent a serious regression. It would
fix into federal law an expansion of the "specific intent" intoxication doctrine to cover
drug intoxications and would do so just at a time when there is an emerging awareness
that, over and above the inadequacies of the doctrine in its "home ground" of alcohol
intoxication, it is specifically unsuited for use in important types of drug intoxication.
27. State v. Hall, 214 N.W.2d 205, 213 (Iowa 1973) (Le Grand, J., dissenting).
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sion: the defendant who killed his girlfriend thinking she was
a nest of snakes;"8 the man who robbed a store, then wandered
slowly about, casually trying two locked doors, before finally
strolling outside.29 If the condition had been the result of a
mental disease, such persons probably would qualify as legally
insane. But in cases of drug intoxication there is, of course, no
"mental disease" and hence no legal insanity under the tests
currently in force.'"
The majority of courts that have considered the insanity
defense in relation to the drug-intoxicated offender have rejected it,3 not only because of the absence of mental disease,
but for one of two related policy reasons.
First, certain courts have determined that public safety
demands rejection of the insanity defense in cases such as X's.
Although the voluntary consumption of drugs may lead "to a
prostration of [the defendant's] mental facilities . . . [a]
condition so induced cannot lead to acquittal, upon the demands of public security." The very fact that a hallucinogenic
drug has effects that are "predictably unforeseeable should
require courts to decide in the public interest that this is not
legally sufficient to completely exculpate a person from murder
or any criminal act." 3
Other courts reject the insanity defense on a second but
related ground: precisely because some drugs are known to
produce unpredictable and potentially dangerous effects, a person using such drugs is personally culpable. He deliberately
takes the risk that as a result of the ingestion of drugs he may
commit a serious harm. It is, after all, common knowledge that
34
drugs have a deleterious effect upon the user. In a recent
Arizona case, State v. Cooper," the State apparently conceded
that defendant was temporarily insane at the time of the act,
28. Regina v. Lipman, [1970] Q.B. 152 (C.A.).
29. People v. Fanning, 265 Cal. App. 2d 729, 71 Cal. Rptr. 641 (1968).
30. See note 3 supra.
31. See note 4 supra.
32. State v. Trantino, 44 N.J. 358, 369, 209 A.2d 117, 122 (1965).
33. Commonwealth v. Campbell, 445 Pa. 487, 495, 284 A.2d 798, 800 (1971).
Juries also are reluctant to release defendants who have done serious harm while under
the influence of drugs. A defendant who took LSD for the first time and then killed a
comparative stranger at a party while hallucinating was found to be sane. "The dilemma facing the jury was that of possibly setting free a person who had committed a
serious crime without any sort of punishment or retribution." Barter & Reite, Crime
and LSD: The Insanity Plea, 126 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 536 (1969).
34. Commonwealth v. Campbell, 445 Pa. 488, 493, 284 A.2d 798, 800 (1971).
35. State v. Cooper, 111 Ariz. 332, 529 P.2d 231 (1974).
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but nevertheless argued that because the condition was
voluntarily caused by defendant, the defense of insanity was
not available to him. The court agreed.
His subsequent condition [after taking amphetamines for
several days], leading to his bizarre actions, was a result

of an artificially produced state of mind brought on by his
own hand at his own choice. The voluntary actions of the
defendant do not provide an excuse in law for his subsequent, irrational conduct."
Our hypothetical defendant X, although temporarily insane at
the time he shot Y, should not be allowed to invoke the insanity
defense. On the facts he is at least partly culpable: his irrational and hence dangerous condition was voluntarily induced.
C.

The Dilemma-and Diminished Capacity
The exclusion of the insanity defense, and the inappositeness of the specific intent exception if correctly applied, would
appear to leave defendant X with no defense, not even in mitigation. Society has found this outcome morally unacceptable
in both alcohol and drug cases ever since the 19th century-and
rightly so, if common sense is any guide. A defendant like X
who commits an act while in a state of delusion, hallucination,
or other gross, chemically-induced derangement of mental faculties is not rational. Whether he means to kill but hallucinates
that his vcitim is a rabid dog; whether he means to kill a
human being whom he deludedly believes to be mortally dangerous to him; whether he means to kill but does so only because his ability to assess the act is seriously deranged as a
result of massive chemical impact on brain function-whatever
the particular facts, the essential fact pattern is the same, and
the legal and moral significance ought to be the same. Such a
person is not fully responsible for his act.
On the other hand, defendant X voluntarily took LSD,
knowing from past experience and from common knowledge
that LSD, or consciousness-altering drugs generally, have varying effects on the mind; that they can and usually do result in
abnormal perception, sensations, and vision; that, in short,
they make the mind irrational. By voluntarily taking LSD,
typically with the intention of producing a significantly altered, irrational state of consciousness, defendant X knowingly
36.

Id. at

__,

529 P.2d at 233.
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and unnecessarily took a risk that he would become disoriented, and hence the risk that he might harm someone or
something as a result. For the voluntary risk he assumed, and
the harm resulting, he should receive punishment-but less
severe punishment than the person who sanely contemplates
and commits the same actual harm.
California attorneys in particular may wish to consider the
diminished capacity defense as a possible solution to the problem. Unfortunately, the diminished capacity concept, as it has
evolved in California case law, has proved a complex and, in
this author's opinion, an unsatisfactory alternative.
Generally, the diminished capacity defense is used only in
situations where specific intent is a requisite element of the
crime charged.37 The defense proceeds along much the same
lines as the more orthodox specific intent exception, and often
uses the same terminology: the defendant must prove that his
mental state was so impaired at the time the crime was committed that he lacked the required specific intent." Thus diminished capacity defense shares the defects of the traditional
specific intent exception with regard to crimes involving druginduced intoxication."
A successful diminished capacity defense in a homicide
case reduces a possible murder conviction to voluntary or involuntary manslaughter. As a consequence, however, the California Supreme courts have saddled themselves with the judicially created concept of non-statutory manslaughter and its
attendant problems. 4 It is not yet clear how much significance
the source of the impairment (alcohol, drugs, mental disturbance not amounting to insanity) may have on the operation of
the defense, nor what degree of impairment must be shown in
each case; in addition, there is, inevitably, considerable over37. Comment, Diminished Capacity, Its PotentialEffect in California, 3 LoYoLA
L.A.L. REV. 153-54 (1970). See generally Cooper, Diminished Capacity, 4 LOYOLA
L.A.L. REV. 308 (1971).
38. People v. Nance, 25 Cal. App. 3d 925, 102 Cal. Rptr. 266 (1972); COMMITTEE
ON STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF Los ANGELES COUNTY,
CALIFORNIA, CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CRIMINAL No. 3.35 (1970); 13 SANTA CLARA
LAW. 249 (1972).
39. See notes 13-19 and accompanying text supra.
40. People v. Ray, 14 Cal. 3d 20, 533 P.2d 1017, 120 Cal. Rptr. 377 (1975) (involuntary manslaughter); People v. Conley, 64 Cal. 2d 310, 411 P.2d 911, 49 Cal. Rptr.
815 (1966); Comment, Diminished Capacity: The Middle Ground of Criminal
Responsibility, 15 SANTA CLARA LAW. 911 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Middle Ground].
41. See People v. Conley, 64 Cal. 2d 310, 411 P.2d 911, 49 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1966);
Middle Ground, supra note 40, at 922-24.
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lap and confusion (indeed, possible conflict) with the separate
but related defenses of insanity and unconsciousness. The result is that the scope and mechanics of the diminished capacity
defense are as yet ill-defined.4"
While recent decisions of the California Supreme Court
appear to be broadening the concept beyond the relatively rigid
framework of the specific intent exception,43 a more straightforward solution would seem preferable to the complicated, piecemeal diminished capacity approach.
The dilemma, then, can be summarized as follows: hypothetical defendant X shot victim Y while in an irrational state
of mind. Because the irrationality was the product of a culpable act-use of a hallucinatory drug with knowledge of the
risk-he is not entitled to a complete defense. Yet some mitigation is warranted: clearly his criminal guilt is not as great as
that of one who commits murder while free from any abnormal
mental condition. Can the issues be formulated in such a way
that these facts are the focus of the adjudication of guilt? Can
the law provide for a realistic assessment of the defendant's
criminal responsibility and a punishment commensurate with
that responsibility?
III.

PROPOSAL: INTOXICATED OFFENDER STATUTES

The suggested approach is to develop statutory crimes in
which criminal conduct while in a state of drug (or alcohol)
intoxication amounting to irrationality is treated much like
criminal recklessness or gross negligence. One analogy is the
causing of death or bodily injury by reckless driving.
Specifically, the jury in a criminal case involving selfinduced intoxication should be asked to resolve two questions:
(1) Was the defendant's mind at the time of the act so disabled
that he could not think or act rationally?44 If the jury finds that
42. See People v. Ray, 14 Cal. 3d 20, 533 P.2d 1017, 120 Cal. Rptr. 377 (1975);
People v. Mosher, 1 Cal. 3d 379, 461 P.2d 659, 82 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1969); People v. Long,
38 Cal. App. 3d 680, 113 Cal. Rptr. 530 (1974); Mental Disabilities, supra note 1;
Comment, Keeping Wolff from the Door, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 1641 (1972); Middle
Ground, supra note 40, at 930-37.
43. See People v. Poddar, 10 Cal. 3d 750, 518 P.2d 342, 111 Cal. Rptr. 910 (1974);
People v. Sedeno, 10 Cal. 3d 703, 518 P.2d 913, 112 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1974). The court
appears to hold in these cases that if a person was irrational at the time of the criminal
act he is not fully responsible for that act.
44. The trial judge in Brinkley v. United States, 498 F.2d 505, 513 n.4 (8th Cir.
1974) (emphasis added), gave this charge: "[lf the act or acts charged as a crime or
as crimes are such acts as to require the acting party to think rationally or to form a
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defendant was irrational, defendant is not guilty of the crime
charged. 5 However, the jury must then ask (2) Was defendant
rational when he voluntarily took the drug, believing it to be a
consciousness-altering substance? If so, then he is criminally
responsible for the danger he risked and the resulting harm. He
should be found guilty of the statutory crime of causing harm
while voluntarily irrational, and he should be punished for it,
although the penalty should be less severe than for the
principal crime. 6
There is no problem, in principle, in establishing appropriate statutory crimes embodying this concept. Similar proposals
47
have been made in connection with alcohol intoxication.
specific intent, and if his faculties are so impaired by drug use that he cannot think
or act rationally . . .then he is not responsible criminally." Those parts of the charge
emphasized here capture the essential nature of the proposal made in this article
insofar as the concept of irrationality is concerned. However, the present thesis rejects
the Brinkley judge's conclusion that if, by reason of drug impairment the defendant
was irrational, he should be found totally non-responsible.
45. It was noted above, see note 6 supra, that the effect of any drug on any person
may vary considerably. It is therefore up to the jury to decide whether, in the case
before it, the ingestion of a drug resulted in irrationality in that defendant. Even those
drugs known as "euphorics" can result in irrationality at times; for example, marijuana, normally an euphoric, can result in acute psychotic reactions characterized by
paranoia and hallucinations. PHARMACOLOGY, supra note 6, at 348. Therefore, the logic
suggested here applies in principle to any drug ingested voluntarily, although irrationality will most commonly occur in conjunction with the hallucinogenic drugs such as
LSD and the amphetamines.
46. This basic concept is developed more fully in Mental Disabilities,supra note
1.
47. Glanville Williams has proposed as a solution "a new statutory offense of
being drunk and dangerous (to person or property); and it should be possible to convict
of this offense on any charge of inflicting or attempting to inflict injury to the person
or damage to property where the defense is one of drunkenness as negativing mens
rea." G. WILLIAMS, THE MENTAL ELEMENT IN CRIME 46 (1965). The proponents of the
Model Penal Code have suggested a section somewhat along the lines proposed here:
"Recklessly Endangering Another Person: A person commits a misdemeanor if he
recklessly engages in conduct which places or may place another person in danger of
death or serious bodily injury." MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.2 (Proposed Official Draft
1962). The revised New York Penal Law states similarly that a "person is guilty of
reckless endangerment in the second degree when he recklessly engages in conduct
which creates a substantial risk of serious physical injury to another." N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 120.20 (McKinney's 1975).
There is, however, a major difference between the approach taken by the two
sections above and the approach proposed here. The basis for creation of a statute
under the thesis herein presented is that some harm must have occurred as a result of
the "recklessly endangering" situation. Simply being in a condition where one mightn
cause harm is punishable under the New York and Model Penal Code provisions. O
the question of whether simple risk-creation, without reference to actual result, should
warrant penal sanctions, see S. KADISH & M. PAULSEN, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES
821-28 (1969), and Wechsler, The Challenge of a Model Penal Code, 65 HARV. L. REV.
1106-07 (1952).
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A public policy similar to the one proposed here would
seem to be the guiding philosophy behind statutes specifically
formulated to deal with vehicular injury or homicide. A brief
examination of this area of the law is revealing. Using California statutes for models, one sees that vehicular manslaughter,
although defined as a third category of manslaughter," fits the
classic definition of involuntary manslaughter. However, when
death is caused by an automobile rather than by some other
instrumentality, the defendant is punishable by a maximum
five-year sentence, as compared with the 15 years prescribed
for conduct that falls within the traditional manslaughter categories. 9 This marked difference in punishment reflects a policy
decision by the legislature that killing unintentionally with a
vehicle, although serious, is less heinous than other kinds of
manslaughter. The legislature undoubtedly felt that juries
would be extremely reluctant to convict a person of manslaughter as the result of a vehicular homicide if the jurors knew that
a severe penalty was possible-as they resist convicting an
intoxicated offender when they know a heavy penalty is possible.
Public policy is reflected in another way by the vehicle
code section which makes reckless driving that causes bodily
injury punishable by a maximum of six months imprisonment.'" This statute appears to provide the prosecutor with a
choice: if the injury was not serious but was culpably-that is,
recklessly or negligently-caused, or if the injuries resulted in
death but were not caused by gross negligence, the lesser penalty under the vehicle code section can be sought. Punishment
192 (West 1970) provides in part:
Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being, without malice. It is of three kinds:

48.

CAL. PEN. CODE §

2. Involuntary-in the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to felony; or in the commission of a lawful act which might produce
death, in an unlawful manner, or without due caution and circumspection . ...
3. In the driving of a vehicle(a) In the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to felony,
with gross negligence; or in the commission of a lawful act which might
produce death, in an unlawful manner, and with gross negligence.
(b) In the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to felony,
without gross negligence; or in the commission of a lawful act which
might produce death, in an unlawful manner, but without gross negligence.
49. CAL. PEN. CODE § 193 (West 1970).
50. CAL. VEH. CODE § 23104 (West 1971).
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is imposed for the act of driving recklessly and causing harm,
but the comparatively light sentence overcomes public resistance to imprisoning a driver for years because he had the
misfortune to hit someone while driving carelessly.
The policy effectuated by these two statutes is essentially
the same one offered here as the basis for intoxicated offender
laws: where there is a risk-taking situation, where a person has
acted carelessly, recklessly or with gross negligence, and where
harm occurs as a result of that risk-filled behavior, a certain
minimal punishment is necessary regardlessof the actual state
5
1
of mind of the defendant at the time the act was committed.
While society recognizes a moral obligation to judge an offender's conduct in light of his capacity to perceive and comply
with his social duty, it should and must exact a penalty from
persons who impair that capacity voluntarily and with reckless
disregard for possible consequences.
Traditional approaches to the problem of criminal responsibility do not offer an appropriate method for assessing the
culpability of the drug-intoxicated offender. The statutory system proposed here would adequately reflect the risks assumed
and allow for punishment commensurate with the resulting
harm, without requiring judges and juries either to close their
eyes to the facts, or to distort legal doctrines that were not
designed to deal with the peculiar problems created by
consciousness-altering drugs.
51. There are, of course, rare cases in which the defendant is proved to have
intentionally induced the intoxicated state for the purpose of facilitating the very
offense charged, as in the case of a person who took a drug to give himself "Dutch
courage." In such cases the entire series of events properly has been viewed as a single,
continuous act for the purpose of proving the crime charged. Cf., e.g., these English
cases: Attorney-General for Northern Ireland v. Gallagher, [1963] A.C. 349 (H.L.);
Thabo Meli v. Regina, [1954] 1 All E.R. 373 (P.C.) (Basutoland). See also H. HART
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